Mitigations and other real security features

Largely invisible security improvements
Software will never be perfect

Erroneous condition logic fails, then cascades through successive failures, often externally controllable

Attackers can perform illegal access+control of code in program & libraries, or toy with kernel surface

Attacker‘s knowledge and methods are improving fast

Developer tools & practices insufficient at preventing bugs

We need multiple layers of defense, including mitigations
I work on mitigations

**Mitigations** are inexpensive tweaks which increase the difficulty of performing attack methods:

- low impact on normal operation
- huge impact during attack-scenario operation

Also, they act as pressure towards robustness in software.

When defect is detected, goal is to Fail-Closed
Robust (adj.)

When used to describe software or computer systems, *robust* can describe one or more of several qualities:
- a system that does not break down easily or is not wholly affected by a single application failure
- a system that either recovers quickly from or holds up well under exceptional circumstances
- a system that is not wholly affected by a bug in one aspect of it

- I strongly disagree – error-recovery is an unsound practice, and detection mechanisms do not exist
- If memory has been overwritten, how does one continue?
Justifying Fail-Closed

1. User becomes aware of bug (in a painful way... but probably less painful than if an attacker does it first)

2. Hopefully some mitigation "detects-and-terminates" execution before control-flow creates a further mess of the stack, which may result in a weaker bug report

3. User files bug report

4. Programmer fixes bug, ships new software

This is Best Current Practice for building good software
Other approaches for handling bugs

Fixing bugs is what happens after you become aware
17 years of mitigation work

%rbx move	syscall sp check	Rev memcpy() detect
.openbsd.randomdata	Library-relinking	stackghost
atexit()-hardening	otto-malloc()	poly-ret scrubbing
X-only .text?
KARL	PIE
random KERNBASE
sigreturn() SROP cookie
x-only kernel?
pledge()
pledgepath()
X-only kernel?
.RETGUARD...
...RETGUARD4
RELRO
ASLR
Pievsep
privdrop
setjmp() cookies
perm-DSO StackProtector
kbind(2)
Kernel W^X
Lots of arc4random
stackghost
poly-ret scrubbing
pie-ret scrubbing
Rev memcpy() detect
fork+exec (never reuse an address space)

These changes cause "weird" or un-standardized operations to **fail-closed** (crash right now, please)
Features of mitigations

- Diminishes effectiveness of a specific attack method
- Efficient, low overhead
- Easy to understand
- Easy to incorporate/apply to old & new code
- One mitigation doesn’t need to fix ALL the problems
- Exposes bugs earlier – improves triage
## Components attackers use

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Knowledge: API, ABI, and beneath

Details of ABI and Implementation sneak upwards, providing attackers with data to use during attack.

These details land on the stack and in registers, and get left behind.

Left behind long enough for attackers to use...
ABI+Implementation leakage

{
    int i;
    void *p = &i;

If a crash happens in following code, you can find the return address based upon the register \( p \) is stored in.

Such low-level details are well-known, defacto-standardized, and exposed for performance reasons – but need it be so always?
Knowledge: stack, register leaks

Implementation details dribble onto the stack and registers

Attackers run the same binaries as you, in a nearly identical environment – therefore they can easily determine what-is-where – this is the surface ROP operates upon

When a bug crashes, they know the regs & stack offsets where many deterministic (integer and pointer) and relative-deterministic (pointer offset) leftovers are found

They just need mechanisms to pivot into control
Attacker tooling: ROP

Hijack instruction sequences using false return frames

Gadget is any small sequence of register/memory transfers above a true ret (or polymorphic ret) instruction

Attacker needs to know where gadgets are, and address of the stack

Other methods: JOP, SROP, etc.
Even scarier: BROP – Blind ROP

An address-space oracle
Repeated probes against reused address-space learns enough to perform minimum ROP operations
Can discover (and thus bypass) certain mitigations
Then, continue using various ROP methods...

(BROP is defeated by never-reuse-an-address-space)
Stack protector example

Attacker depends on knowing:
- Location in memory of stack
- ordering or stack objects
- callframe ordering:
  (in-args, savepc, savefp, locals)

Stack protector disturbs the simplest attack methodologies

(We have a better stack protector brewing)
Attack methods use 3 kinds of values found in stack/registers:
- absolute integer values
- relative addresses (offsets)
- absolute addresses (pointers)
To 3 places: code, data, stack.

ASLR increases difficulty of attack
Costs – time for a discussion

• Not all mitigations will be performance-cost-free
• Processors have gotten faster
• What % of performance would you spend on security?
• Most mitigations are a reimplementations of an existing mechanism, just more strictly
Shared library improvements

Progressive improvements – in the old days the GOT & PLT were writeable!

- Secure-PLT
- No more relocs
- RELRO
- kbind()
- DT_BIND_NOW

Takes decades to add strictness / security
Malloc hardening

OpenBSD malloc hardened in 20 ways or more
- significant randomness, object rotation, meta-data protection, double-free and use-after-free detection, heap-overflow detection, …

Half of hardening features enabled by default
(Expensive ones not enabled, but available during devcycle)

Also API hardening: reallocarray(), reallocarray() freezero()
Pledge: Realistic POSIX subsets

No subtle behaviour changes

No error returns

**Fails-closed**

Illegal operations crash

Easy to learn
How does pledge help?

2nd specification of a program’s behaviour and requirements is embedded directly into the program.

No behaviour changes -- only detects that the programmer’s 2nd specification has been violated

2nd specification allows programmer to test their assumptions about system call use
Pledge does an excellent job ENFORCING the security-specialization when a task is privilege-separated:

```
pledge("stdio")
pledge("stdio inet")
```
Common ideas behind mitigations

- Reduce externally-discoverable knowledge
- Improve historical weaknesses of permission models
- Disrupt non-standard control-flow methods
- Education of separation-of-duty during program design
- Reduce syscall availability during execution
Mitigations change details which are not specified by any standard

In ways which seem to harm current attack methods, and help us debug code
Resistance against mitigations

• Some await language/compiler advances to save us all
• Some prefer long-term binary-compatibility over attempts at security
• Some run a business model that requires ignoring security
• Some say technology-X-will-save-us, but when X-fails-to-compile-perl, they scurry away in silence
• NIH syndrome remains strong
Limiting choice is related to safety
Safety System Innovations are crucial

- Old solutions may not match modern
- World market for computers now exceeds 5
- Don’t get tied down by policy of backwards compatibility forever
- Innovation is crucial to the success of any technical endeavour
- Don’t sleep on shoulders of giants
Questions?
Postel‘s maxim is dangerous

IETF: draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-02.txt

In network protocols, there are evolutionary risk factors due to non-strict specification

Similar problem with conserving ABI+below, which benefits attackers greatly

POSIX (standard) is already too liberal

POSIX (implementations) are full of historical defacto-standard behaviours which attackers can rely upon